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DLD-119        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3032 
___________ 
 
JOSHUA BOWENS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CO MATTHEWS; CO MATT; CO MARTIN; JOHN/JANE DOES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil No. 2-17-cv-04800) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 28, 2019 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD , Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Joshua Bowens, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding in 
forma pauperis, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of a civil rights action he 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
Bowens alleged that his civil rights were violated when the defendants, who are 
correctional officers at SCI Graterford, lost certain documents that he claims were 
necessary for his ongoing postconviction (PCRA) proceedings.  Around June 5, 2017, 
Bowens was admitted to a psychiatric observation cell, and his property was confiscated 
by the defendants.  Around June 12, 2017, Bowens returned to the unit where he was 
previously assigned, and most of his property was returned to him.  However, he 
discovered that he was missing certain legal documents, related to his “mental health 
illness, defect, condition, treatment and history,” which were considered by the trial judge 
who had presided over his sentencing in 2005. 
Bowens alleged that he needed these documents in order to support his PCRA 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental health history 
and request a competency hearing.  He filed an inmate grievance seeking the return of the 
documents.  The grievance was denied.  After that denial, in October 2017, Bowens filed 
his civil rights complaint against the defendants. 
In December 2017, Defendant Matthews filed a motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  In February 2018, the District Court held a hearing on 
the motion.  Based on representations from Bowens regarding the allegedly missing 
documents, the District Court ordered the defendants to produce two mental health 
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reports which had been ordered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 
during Bowens’ criminal trial in state court.  In March 2018, Matthews’ counsel filed a 
supplement to the motion to dismiss, indicating that she had located a 2004 psychological 
reevaluation report from Bowens’ school district and a 2005 mental health evaluation, 
both of which were ordered around the time of Bowens’ conviction.  Those reports were 
provided to the District Court and to Bowens.   
Bowens then filed a response in which he stated that those reports were not the 
missing documents confiscated from his cell.  He did not elaborate further on the 
documents that were allegedly missing, or explain what unique information they 
contained, in light of the two reports that were provided to him.  Nor did he explain how 
the information in the missing reports would support his PCRA claim, although he did 
allege—in one paragraph in a discovery motion—that a reason given for the denial of his 
PCRA petition was his failure to produce those reports. 
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, and dismissed Matthews’ 
complaint with prejudice.  This timely appeal ensued.1 
II. 
                                              
1 Although Bowens’ timely motion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) 
requested an extension of 60 days to file a notice of appeal, the District Court properly 
granted him only 30 days, and Bowens timely filed his appeal within that extended 
period.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C); cf. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of 
Chicago, 138 S.Ct. 13, 17 (2017).  On the same day that Bowens filed his notice of 
appeal, he also filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b).  His notice of appeal here does not encompass the District Court’s subsequent 
denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, as he did not file a new or amended notice of appeal 
from the order denying the Rule 60(b) motion.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), W. Penn Allegheny 
Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010), and ask whether the 
complaint contained “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may summarily affirm a district 
court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a 
substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam); Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
III. 
We agree with the District Court’s determination that Bowens’ primary claim is an 
access-to-the-courts claim.  Thus, Bowens was required to plead that he suffered an 
actual injury, meaning his “efforts to pursue a legal claim” were prejudiced.  Oliver v. 
Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 
(1996)).  When a plaintiff alleges the loss of an opportunity to present a past legal claim, 
the underlying claim must be “nonfrivolous” or “arguable,” and the plaintiff must “have 
no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the 
present denial of access suit.”  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)).  The complaint “must 
describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere 
hope,’ and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.’”  Id. at 205-06 (citing Christopher at 416-
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17). 
Here, Bowens failed to allege a plausible access-to-the-courts claim.  His 
complaint made only conclusory allegations that the unavailability of two mental health 
reports caused the denial of his PCRA petition.  To the extent that Bowens described his 
PCRA claim at all, he did not describe it well enough to show that it is “nonfrivolous” or 
“arguable.”  Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205.  Even if it were arguable, he did not allege any 
prejudice from the defendants’ actions, as he failed to allege what specific information 
the confiscated mental health reports would have provided to support his PCRA claim.  
Moreover, we note that Bowens’ PCRA petition was denied in September 2016, and his 
appeal was pending until May 2018, when the Superior Court affirmed.  See Com. v. 
Bowen, No. 3159 EDA 2016, 2018 WL 2295672 at *2 (Pa. Super. 2018).2  Bowens 
alleged that he had the two missing reports in his possession until June 5, 2017.  Thus, his 
allegation that his PCRA claim was prejudiced by the defendants’ confiscation of the 
reports is not plausible, as Bowens failed to submit the reports well before the defendants 
had confiscated them.  See Oliver, 118 F.3d at 178. 
Bowens’ Due Process claims lack merit.  Neither the negligent nor even the 
unauthorized, intentional deprivation of property by a state employee gives rise to a due 
process violation if state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.  Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).  Bowens had, and pursued, adequate post-deprivation 
                                              
2 To the extent necessary, we take judicial notice of these facts.  See Sands v. 
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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remedies in the form of prison grievance procedures.  See Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. 
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000).3  To the extent that Bowens claimed that his 
grievances were wrongfully denied, he has not alleged the denial of a federal right.  See 
Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A state-created prison grievance 
procedure is simply a procedural right and does not confer any substantive right upon an 
inmate.”); see also Woods v. City of Michigan City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275, 285 (7th Cir. 
1991) (“Due process does not guarantee ‘right’ substantive outcomes or correct 
conclusions of law.”).  To the extent that Bowens raised a substantive due process claim, 
he failed to allege that the defendants’ confiscation of his papers shocks the conscience.  
See Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Bowens’ remaining claims also lack merit.  His single, bald assertion that the 
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs, and failed to 
protect him from harm, is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.  See 
generally Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017).  To the extent 
that his Eighth Amendment claim is based on the confiscation of his mental health 
reports, the claim fails because Bowens did not plausibly allege that the confiscation 
“result[ed] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”  See Betts 
v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Finally, Bowens has not alleged the violation of any specific 
                                              
3 Additionally, Bowens may submit a records request to obtain documents issued or 
retained by the state, see 65 Pa. Stat. §§ 67.301 et seq., and may pursue state tort law 
claims. 
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fundamental right that might be protected by the Ninth Amendment.  See Murray, 650 
F.3d at 247 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring)).4 
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
Bowens’ motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  See generally Tabron v. Grace, 6 
F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).  Bowens’ motion to supplement the record is denied.  See 
generally Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 435 (3d Cir. 2013).5  
                                              
4 Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court properly denied leave to amend.  
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
5 Bowens’ motion to supplement the record includes an unsigned prison form regarding 
the return of his property.  Because we have accepted as true Bowens’ allegation that the 
defendants never returned the property at issue, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, the prison 
form would not change our analysis above. 
